Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market | |
Wei, Qi; Li, Lin-Jing | |
刊名 | Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science |
2020-02-20 | |
卷号 | 40期号:2页码:919-928 |
关键词 | Carbon Dynamics Profitability Carbon emission trading Dynamic game Graded and progressive Penalty coefficient Power generation enterprise Power generation industries Punishment mechanism Supervision systems |
ISSN号 | 10006923 |
英文摘要 | Under the consideration of emission reduction efficiency and the purpose of maximizing the economic surplus in the carbon market, a two-stage dynamic game mechanism between the government and duopoly enterprises was constructed, and the effects of graded and progressive punishment mechanism on the power generation, profits of large and small enterprises and economic surplus were studied. The results showed that with the increase of penalty coefficient, if the large power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation, total profit and economic surplus decreased by 7.47%, 15.34% and 5.88%; if the small power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation decreased by 1.43%, the total profit decreased by 3.39% or increased by 0.03%, and the economic surplus increased by 0.13%; if the large power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 16.35%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 15.34%; if the small power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 3.39%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit increased by 0.03%. Therefore, when designing a punishment mechanism for the power generation industry, we should increase the penalties and set up a graded and progressive punishment mechanism, according to the enterprise scale and carbon market participation, and an effective supervision system should be established. © 2020, Editorial Board of China Environmental Science. All right reserved. |
语种 | 中文 |
出版者 | Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
源URL | [http://ir.lut.edu.cn/handle/2XXMBERH/115147] |
专题 | 经济管理学院 |
作者单位 | School of Economic and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou; 730050, China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wei, Qi,Li, Lin-Jing. Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market[J]. Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science,2020,40(2):919-928. |
APA | Wei, Qi,&Li, Lin-Jing.(2020).Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market.Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science,40(2),919-928. |
MLA | Wei, Qi,et al."Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market".Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science 40.2(2020):919-928. |
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