Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents

doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2105

CORC > 数学与系统科学研究院 > 中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院 > 应用数学研究所

	Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents
	Cao, Zhigang 5; Chen, Bo 2; Chen, Xujin 1,3; Wang, Changjun 1,4
刊名	OPERATIONS RESEARCH
	2021-07-20
页码	17
关键词	selfish atomic routing deterministic queuing adaptive routing subgame perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium
ISSN号	0030-364X
DOI	10.1287/opre.2021.2105
英文摘要	We propose a game model for selfish routing of atomic agents, who compete for use of a network to travel from their origins to a common destination as quickly as possible. We follow a frequently used rule that the latency an agent experiences on each edge is a constant transit time plus a variable waiting time in a queue. A key feature that differentiates our model from related ones is an edge-based tie-breaking rule for prioritizing agents in queueing when they reach an edge at the same time. We study both nonadaptive agents (each choosing a one-off origin-destination path simultaneously at the very beginning) and adaptive ones (each making an online decision at every nonterminal vertex they reach as to which next edge to take). On the one hand, we constructively prove that a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) always exists for nonadaptive agents and show that every NE is weakly Pareto optimal and globally first-in first-out. We present efficient algorithms for finding an NE and best responses of nonadaptive agents. On the other hand, we are among the first to consider adaptive atomic agents, for which we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) always exists and that each NE outcome for nonadaptive agents is an SPE outcome for adaptive agents but not vice versa.
资助项目	Ministry of Science and Technology of China[2018AAA0101002] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[11601022] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[11971046] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71922003] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71871009] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71961137005] ; Young Elite Scientists Sponsorship Program by CAST[2018QNRC001] ; Chinese Academy of Sciences[XDA27010102] ; Chinese Academy of Sciences[ZDBS-LY-7008]
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science
语种	英语
出版者	INFORMS
WOS记录号	WOS:000708983500001
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/59428]
专题	应用数学研究所
通讯作者	Wang, Changjun
作者单位	1.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 2.Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England 3.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Math Sci, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China 4.Beijing Univ Technol, Coll Math, Fac Sci, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China 5.Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Cao, Zhigang,Chen, Bo,Chen, Xujin,et al. Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents[J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH,2021:17.
APA	Cao, Zhigang,Chen, Bo,Chen, Xujin,&Wang, Changjun.(2021).Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents.OPERATIONS RESEARCH,17.
MLA	Cao, Zhigang,et al."Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents".OPERATIONS RESEARCH (2021):17.