rationalsecretsharingasextensivegames

CORC > 数学与系统科学研究院 > 中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院 > 系统科学研究所

	rationalsecretsharingasextensivegames
	Zhang Zhifang; Liu Mulan
刊名	sciencechinainformationscience
	2013
卷号	56 期号:3
ISSN号	1674-733X
英文摘要	The threat that comes from previously used punishment strategies in rational secret sharing is weakened because the punishment somtimes also causes loss to the punisher himself. In this paper, we first model 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing in an extensive game with imperfect information, and then provide a strategy for achieving secret recovery in this game. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a sequential equilibrium which means after any history of the game no player can benefit from deviations so long as the other players stick to the strategy. In particular, when a deviation is detected, the punishment executed by the punisher is still his optimal option. Therefor, by considering rational secret sharing as an extensive game, we design punishment strategies that effectively punish the deviants and meanwhile guarantee punishers' benefit. Hence, these punishments are more credible than previous ones. Except assuming the existence of simultaneous channels, our scheme can have dealer off-line and extend to the t-out-of-n setting, and also satisfies computational equilibria in some sense.
资助项目	[National Natural Science Foundation of China] ; [Foundation of President of AMSS, CAS]
语种	英语
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/48829]
专题	系统科学研究所
作者单位	中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhang Zhifang,Liu Mulan. rationalsecretsharingasextensivegames[J]. sciencechinainformationscience,2013,56(3).
APA	Zhang Zhifang,&Liu Mulan.(2013).rationalsecretsharingasextensivegames.sciencechinainformationscience,56(3).
MLA	Zhang Zhifang,et al."rationalsecretsharingasextensivegames".sciencechinainformationscience 56.3(2013).