A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets

doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2015.11.010

CORC > 计算技术研究所 > 中国科学院计算技术研究所 > 中国科学院计算技术研究所期刊论文 > 英文

	A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets
	Chen, Shuang 1,2; Liu, Min 1; Chen, Xiao 1,2
刊名	COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS
	2016-05-01
卷号	81 页码:31-42
关键词	Mobile crowdsensing Double auction Truthful mechanism Heterogeneous market
ISSN号	0140-3664
DOI	10.1016/j.comcom.2015.11.010
英文摘要	Incentive mechanisms are critical for the success of mobile crowdsensing (MCS). Existing mechanisms mainly focus on scenarios where all sensing tasks are belong to a monopolistic campaign, while ignoring the situation where multiple campaigns coexist and compete for potential sensing capacities. In this paper, we study mechanisms in a two-sided heterogeneous MCS market with multiple requesters and users, where each requester publishes a sensing campaign consisting of various tasks whereas each user can undertake multiple tasks from one or more campaigns. The mechanism design in such a market is very challenging as the demands and supplies are extremely diverse. To fairly and effectively allocate resources and facilitate trades, we propose a novel truthful double auction mechanism named TDMC. By introducing a carefully designed virtual padding requester, a two-stage allocation approach and corresponding pricing schemes for both requesters and users are developed in TDMC. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that TDMC has the properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance, computational tractability, and asymptotic efficiency as the workload supply compared with demand becomes more and more sufficient. To make TDMC more adaptable, we further introduce two more flexible bid profiles for both requesters and users, and two adjustment methods to control the sensing quality. Extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of TDMC. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
资助项目	National Natural Science Foundation of China[61132001] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61120106008] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61472402] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61472404] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61272474] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61202410] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61502457] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61572476]
WOS研究方向	Computer Science ; Engineering ; Telecommunications
语种	英语
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
WOS记录号	WOS:000374608600003
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://119.78.100.204/handle/2XEOYT63/8492]
专题	中国科学院计算技术研究所期刊论文_英文
通讯作者	Liu, Min
作者单位	1.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Comp Technol, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Comp & Control Engn, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Chen, Shuang,Liu, Min,Chen, Xiao. A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets[J]. COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS,2016,81:31-42.
APA	Chen, Shuang,Liu, Min,&Chen, Xiao.(2016).A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets.COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS,81,31-42.
MLA	Chen, Shuang,et al."A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets".COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS 81(2016):31-42.