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Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference
Li, Chao; Cheng, Si-Jie; Cheng, Peng-Fei*
刊名SYMMETRY-BASEL
2019
卷号11期号:7
关键词sales team information symmetry moral hazard loss aversion BSDE HJB equation
ISSN号2073-8994
DOI10.3390/sym11070864
URL标识查看原文
WOS记录号WOS:000481979000029
内容类型期刊论文
URI标识http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/3326428
专题中南大学
作者单位1.[Cheng, Peng-Fei
2.Li, Chao] Hunan Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Xiangtan 411201, Peoples R China.
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Li, Chao,Cheng, Si-Jie,Cheng, Peng-Fei*. Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference[J]. SYMMETRY-BASEL,2019,11(7).
APA Li, Chao,Cheng, Si-Jie,&Cheng, Peng-Fei*.(2019).Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference.SYMMETRY-BASEL,11(7).
MLA Li, Chao,et al."Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference".SYMMETRY-BASEL 11.7(2019).
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