Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference | |
Li, Chao; Cheng, Si-Jie; Cheng, Peng-Fei* | |
刊名 | SYMMETRY-BASEL
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2019 | |
卷号 | 11期号:7 |
关键词 | sales team information symmetry moral hazard loss aversion BSDE HJB equation |
ISSN号 | 2073-8994 |
DOI | 10.3390/sym11070864 |
URL标识 | 查看原文 |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000481979000029 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
URI标识 | http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/3326428 |
专题 | 中南大学 |
作者单位 | 1.[Cheng, Peng-Fei 2.Li, Chao] Hunan Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Xiangtan 411201, Peoples R China. |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Li, Chao,Cheng, Si-Jie,Cheng, Peng-Fei*. Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference[J]. SYMMETRY-BASEL,2019,11(7). |
APA | Li, Chao,Cheng, Si-Jie,&Cheng, Peng-Fei*.(2019).Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference.SYMMETRY-BASEL,11(7). |
MLA | Li, Chao,et al."Optimal Incentive Contract for Sales Team with Loss Aversion Preference".SYMMETRY-BASEL 11.7(2019). |
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