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	Performance Analysis on Private Vehicle Plate Auction in Shanghai
	Feng, Suwei; Ma, Zuqi
	2010
关键词	private vehicle plate auction public regulation stakeholder performance
页码	6-12
英文摘要	Since 1986, the private vehicle plate auction (PVPA) in Shanghai has gradually turned into one of the effective regulation measures to eliminate total amount of private vehicles. Rooted from the public economics and governmental regulation theories, this paper presents three main reasons irrational travel decision-making, excess car demand and social inequality on road right why private vehicles need to be regulated by plate auction, and takes the PVPA as one of the vehicle quota regulation measures among marketing tools. After qualitatively analyzing the social benefit and cost of PVPA, this paper emphasizes on stakeholder analysis which demonstrates respective preference and choice between Shanghai and ecdemic plates of different groups. The performance of this policy relies on the difference between the increasing vehicles with ecdemic plates and the decrease of potential vehicle buyers who abandon purchase due to expensive auction price of Shanghai plates. Finally in a "with-and-without" policy scenario, a quantitative prediction has been conducted, revealing the fact that till 2008 around 830 thousand to 2.73 million vehicles have been totally eliminated by PVPA policy according to different elasticity of vehicle development to income.
会议录出版者	INST ENGINEERING TECH-IET
会议录出版地	MICHAEL FARADAY HOUSE, STEVENAGE, HERTS SG1 2AY, ENGLAND
语种	英语
WOS研究方向	Transportation
WOS记录号	WOS:000392683200002
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/3122]
专题	上海财经大学
作者单位	Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Econ & Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Feng, Suwei,Ma, Zuqi. Performance Analysis on Private Vehicle Plate Auction in Shanghai[C]. 见:.

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