A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment | |
He, Simai1; Sethuraman, Jay2; Wang, Xuan3; Zhang, Jiawei4,5 | |
刊名 | OPERATIONS RESEARCH |
2017-11-01 | |
卷号 | 65期号:6页码:1562-1573 |
关键词 | joint replenishment cost-sharing game payoff dominant Nash equilibrium price of anarchy price of stability |
ISSN号 | 0030-364X |
DOI | 10.1287/opre.2017.1645 |
英文摘要 | We consider the infinite-horizon multiple retailer joint replenishment problem with first-order interaction. In this model, the joint setup cost incurred by a group of retailers placing an order simultaneously consists of a group-independent major setup cost and retailer-specific minor setup costs. The goal is to determine an inventory replenishment policy that minimizes the long-run average system-wide cost. In this paper, we adopt a noncooperative approach to study the joint replenishment game. We consider the allocation rule in which the major setup cost is split equally among the retailers who place an order together, and each retailer pays his own holding and minor setup costs. Given the preannounced allocation rule, each retailer determines his replenishment policy to minimize his own cost anticipating the other retailers' strategy. We show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium exists, and quantify the efficiency loss of the non-cooperative outcome relative to the social optimum. Although the worst-case ratio between the best decentralized outcome and the social optimum is O((ln n)(1/2)), where n is the number of retailers, numerical results suggest that the best equilibrium is near optimal. |
WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science |
语种 | 英语 |
出版者 | INFORMS |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000415209800010 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
源URL | [http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/861] |
专题 | 上海财经大学 |
通讯作者 | He, Simai |
作者单位 | 1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Informat Management & Engn, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China; 2.Columbia Univ, Dept Ind Engn & Operat Res, New York, NY 10027 USA; 3.Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Informat Syst Business Stat & Operat Managem, Business Sch, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China; 4.NYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA; 5.New York Univ Shanghai, Shanghai 200122, Peoples R China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | He, Simai,Sethuraman, Jay,Wang, Xuan,et al. A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment[J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH,2017,65(6):1562-1573. |
APA | He, Simai,Sethuraman, Jay,Wang, Xuan,&Zhang, Jiawei.(2017).A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment.OPERATIONS RESEARCH,65(6),1562-1573. |
MLA | He, Simai,et al."A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment".OPERATIONS RESEARCH 65.6(2017):1562-1573. |
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