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A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment
He, Simai1; Sethuraman, Jay2; Wang, Xuan3; Zhang, Jiawei4,5
刊名OPERATIONS RESEARCH
2017-11-01
卷号65期号:6页码:1562-1573
关键词joint replenishment cost-sharing game payoff dominant Nash equilibrium price of anarchy price of stability
ISSN号0030-364X
DOI10.1287/opre.2017.1645
英文摘要We consider the infinite-horizon multiple retailer joint replenishment problem with first-order interaction. In this model, the joint setup cost incurred by a group of retailers placing an order simultaneously consists of a group-independent major setup cost and retailer-specific minor setup costs. The goal is to determine an inventory replenishment policy that minimizes the long-run average system-wide cost. In this paper, we adopt a noncooperative approach to study the joint replenishment game. We consider the allocation rule in which the major setup cost is split equally among the retailers who place an order together, and each retailer pays his own holding and minor setup costs. Given the preannounced allocation rule, each retailer determines his replenishment policy to minimize his own cost anticipating the other retailers' strategy. We show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium exists, and quantify the efficiency loss of the non-cooperative outcome relative to the social optimum. Although the worst-case ratio between the best decentralized outcome and the social optimum is O((ln n)(1/2)), where n is the number of retailers, numerical results suggest that the best equilibrium is near optimal.
WOS研究方向Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science
语种英语
出版者INFORMS
WOS记录号WOS:000415209800010
内容类型期刊论文
源URL[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/861]  
专题上海财经大学
通讯作者He, Simai
作者单位1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Informat Management & Engn, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China;
2.Columbia Univ, Dept Ind Engn & Operat Res, New York, NY 10027 USA;
3.Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Informat Syst Business Stat & Operat Managem, Business Sch, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China;
4.NYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA;
5.New York Univ Shanghai, Shanghai 200122, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
He, Simai,Sethuraman, Jay,Wang, Xuan,et al. A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment[J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH,2017,65(6):1562-1573.
APA He, Simai,Sethuraman, Jay,Wang, Xuan,&Zhang, Jiawei.(2017).A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment.OPERATIONS RESEARCH,65(6),1562-1573.
MLA He, Simai,et al."A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment".OPERATIONS RESEARCH 65.6(2017):1562-1573.
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