Health insurance, market power, and social welfare

doi:10.1111/ijet.12137

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Health insurance, market power, and social welfare
	Liang, Run 1; Wang, Hao 2
刊名	INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
	2017-12
卷号	13 期号:4 页码:427-442
关键词	health care health insurance market power social welfare vertical integration
ISSN号	1742-7355
DOI	10.1111/ijet.12137
英文摘要	This paper considers the welfare effects of health insurance. With a rather general model, we show that the presence of traditional health insurance makes consumers worse off when the marginal cost of health care is low enough, while always making the health care provider better off. The presence of traditional health insurance increases social welfare, but cannot achieve the socially optimal outcome. Furthermore, we consider a market structure called "integrated health insurance" and show that in a health care market where a firm provides not only health care but also health insurance, the socially optimal outcome can be achieved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	WILEY
WOS记录号	WOS:000414513000005
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/834]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Wang, Hao
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Adv Res, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 2.Peking Univ, Natl Sch Dev, Beijing, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Liang, Run,Wang, Hao. Health insurance, market power, and social welfare[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,2017,13(4):427-442.
APA	Liang, Run,&Wang, Hao.(2017).Health insurance, market power, and social welfare.INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,13(4),427-442.
MLA	Liang, Run,et al."Health insurance, market power, and social welfare".INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 13.4(2017):427-442.