Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.004

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case
	Cheung, Man-Wah 1; Lahkar, Ratul 2
刊名	GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
	2018-03
卷号	108 页码:341-362
关键词	Potential games Cournot competition model Aggregative games Externalities
ISSN号	0899-8256
DOI	10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.004
英文摘要	This paper studies large population (nonatomic) potential games with continuous strategy sets. We define such games as population games in which the payoff function is equal to the gradient of a real-valued function called the potential function. The Cournot competition model with continuous player set and continuous strategy set is our main example and is analyzed in detail. For general potential games, we establish that maximizers of potential functions are Nash equilibria. For a particular class of potential games called aggregative potential games, we characterize Nash equilibria using a one-dimensional analogue of the potential function, which we call the quasi-potential function. Finally, we show that a large population potential game is the limit of a sequence of finite player potential games as the number of players approaches infinity. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
WOS记录号	WOS:000439254400028
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/670]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Cheung, Man-Wah
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 111 Wuchuan Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China; 2.Indian Inst Management Udaipur, Econ Area, Udaipur 313001, Rajasthan, India
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Cheung, Man-Wah,Lahkar, Ratul. Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,2018,108:341-362.
APA	Cheung, Man-Wah,&Lahkar, Ratul.(2018).Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case.GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,108,341-362.
MLA	Cheung, Man-Wah,et al."Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case".GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 108(2018):341-362.