The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.004

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
	He, Simin 1,2; Offerman, Theo 3,4; van de Ven, Jeroen 4,5
刊名	JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
	2019-05
卷号	181 页码:238-273
关键词	Mixed-motive games Sequential communication Feigned-ignorance principle
ISSN号	0022-0531
DOI	10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.004
英文摘要	We study theoretically and experimentally the extent to which communication can solve coordination problems when there is some conflict of interest. We investigate various communication protocols, including one in which players chat sequentially and free-format. We develop a model based on the 'feigned-ignorance principle', according to which players ignore any communication unless they reach an agreement in which both players are (weakly) better off. With standard preferences, the model predicts that communication is effective in Battle-of-the-Sexes but futile in Chicken. A remarkable implication is that increasing players' payoffs can make them worse off, by making communication futile. Our experimental findings provide strong support for these and some other predictions. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
WOS记录号	WOS:000467517200008
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/266]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	He, Simin
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 111 Wuchuan Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China; 2.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Key Lab Math Econ, 111 Wuchuan Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China; 3.Univ Amsterdam, CREED, Roetersstr 11, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands; 4.Tinbergen Inst, NL-1082 MS Amsterdam, Netherlands; 5.Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam Sch Econ, Roetersstr 11, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	He, Simin,Offerman, Theo,van de Ven, Jeroen. The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,2019,181:238-273.
APA	He, Simin,Offerman, Theo,&van de Ven, Jeroen.(2019).The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,181,238-273.
MLA	He, Simin,et al."The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games".JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 181(2019):238-273.