哲学直觉的证据地位——认知科学是否有一席之地; The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuitions:Is There a Role for Cognitive Science? | |
[美]阿尔文·戈德曼 ; Alvin I·Goldman | |
2014-10 | |
关键词 | 直觉 intuition 认知科学 cognitive science 证据 evidence |
英文摘要 | 阿尔文•戈德曼(Alvin I. Goldman),美国罗格斯大学哲学系教授。; 【中文摘要】20世纪中叶的心理学研究降低了目击证言证据的分量和强度,实验哲学家通过在受控制的环境系统中测试受访者,同样找到了质疑直觉状态作为可靠证据来源的理由,而一些传统主义者却否认认知科学能够质疑哲学直觉判断的可靠性。我们不应该急于对哲学直觉的错误成分做出最终的判断。一方面,在个人认知的分类形成过程中,还有许多研究需要去实施;另一方面,根据孔多赛的“陪审团定理”,一旦我们意识到哲学需要利用群体共同发生的直觉,那么就可以大幅提髙直觉方法在哲学上的证据价值。 【Abstract】Psychological research in the middle decades of the twentieth century reduced the weight and trustworthiness of eyewitness testimonial evidence; experimental philosophers have found grounds to doubt intuition's status as a reliable source of evidence by testing respondents in a controlled setting; some traditionalists, however, resist the idea that cognitive science is capable of casting doubt on the reliability of philosophical intuitional judgments. We should not to rush to a final judgment about the error-proneness of philosophical intuition. On the one hand, there is much more research to be done on the classification-formation processes of individual cognizers; on the other hand, according to the Marquis de Condorcet's Jury Theorem, once we appreciate that philosophy is in a position to utilize the concurring intuitions of a group, this may considerably add to the evidential value in the philosophy of the intuitional method. |
语种 | 中文 |
出版者 | 厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)编辑部 |
内容类型 | 其他 |
源URL | [http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/94639] |
专题 | 2014年 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | [美]阿尔文·戈德曼,Alvin I·Goldman. 哲学直觉的证据地位——认知科学是否有一席之地, The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuitions:Is There a Role for Cognitive Science?. 2014-10-01. |
个性服务 |
查看访问统计 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。
修改评论