Capacity Commitment in a Spatial Differentiated Market | |
Qiang Gong ; Yuk-fai Fong | |
2012-04-24 ; 2012-04-24 | |
关键词 | Capacity Commitment Spatial Differentiated Market |
中文摘要 | This paper considers the capacity commitment in spatial differentiated market (quantity competition). Excluding possible monopoly result, we find the solutions of quantity competition and price competition are same in some range when transportation cost is not too low but they are different when transportation cost is low. In contrast to price competition has a single equilibrium; there exist multi sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in quantity competition when the transportation cost is low. When the transportation cost is some range (neither too high nor too low), there exist multi-equilibrium solution in both price competition and quantity competition. Further more, price competition and quantity competition has the same symmetric equilibrium solutions when transportation cost is not too low. But capacity commitment can help the firm collusion when transportation cost is low. |
语种 | 英语 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
源URL | [http://ir.calis.edu.cn/hdl/211010/3905] ![]() |
专题 | 北京大学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Qiang Gong,Yuk-fai Fong. Capacity Commitment in a Spatial Differentiated Market[J],2012, 2012. |
APA | Qiang Gong,&Yuk-fai Fong.(2012).Capacity Commitment in a Spatial Differentiated Market.. |
MLA | Qiang Gong,et al."Capacity Commitment in a Spatial Differentiated Market".(2012). |
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