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Capacity Commitment in a Spatial Differentiated Market
Qiang Gong ; Yuk-fai Fong
2012-04-24 ; 2012-04-24
关键词Capacity Commitment Spatial Differentiated Market
中文摘要This paper considers the capacity commitment in spatial differentiated market (quantity competition). Excluding possible monopoly result, we find the solutions of quantity competition and price competition are same in some range when transportation cost is not too low but they are different when transportation cost is low. In contrast to price competition has a single equilibrium; there exist multi sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in quantity competition when the transportation cost is low. When the transportation cost is some range (neither too high nor too low), there exist multi-equilibrium solution in both price competition and quantity competition. Further more, price competition and quantity competition has the same symmetric equilibrium solutions when transportation cost is not too low. But capacity commitment can help the firm collusion when transportation cost is low.
语种英语
内容类型期刊论文
源URL[http://ir.calis.edu.cn/hdl/211010/3905]  
专题北京大学
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Qiang Gong,Yuk-fai Fong. Capacity Commitment in a Spatial Differentiated Market[J],2012, 2012.
APA Qiang Gong,&Yuk-fai Fong.(2012).Capacity Commitment in a Spatial Differentiated Market..
MLA Qiang Gong,et al."Capacity Commitment in a Spatial Differentiated Market".(2012).
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