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定律、因果性与行动的意向性说明
徐竹 ; XU Zhu
2010-06-07 ; 2010-06-07
关键词意向性说明 因果性 定律 社会科学哲学 N02
其他题名Laws,Causality and Intentional Explanation of Action
中文摘要行动的意向性说明是否需要定律,是否是一种因果说明,这是两个相互联系的问题。Popper-Hempel论题认为,意向性说明需要依赖普遍定律,但这种观点面临着真实性与一般性的两难困境。在W.C.Salmon的因果性本体论解释的意义上,即便意向性说明不必然依赖定律,也仍然可以是因果说明。基于此,我们能够反驳关于"理由不是行动原因"的三个典型论证:"原因的合适类型"论证、"逻辑关系"论证和"遵守规则"论证。这种反驳揭示出,理由与行动之间的因果关系能够为意向性说明的正当性提供辩护。; There are two connected questions about intentional explanation: (1) should intentional explanation involve universal laws? (2) Could intentional explanation be considered as a type of causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel thesis argues that explanations of action must involve universal laws, which however has encountered crucial critiques. This paper wants to argue, though it doesn’t have to involve universal laws, intentional explanation of action can be a causal explanation in the sense of W. C. Salmon’s allegation. On that ontological interpretation of causality, there is a criterion of justification for intentional explanation: Explaining the action A with a reason R can be justified, if there is causation between R and A. Three typical arguments which claim that reason couldn't be a cause of action can be refuted in that sense.
语种中文 ; 中文
内容类型期刊论文
源URL[http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/42861]  
专题清华大学
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
徐竹,XU Zhu. 定律、因果性与行动的意向性说明[J],2010, 2010.
APA 徐竹,&XU Zhu.(2010).定律、因果性与行动的意向性说明..
MLA 徐竹,et al."定律、因果性与行动的意向性说明".(2010).
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