Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation

	Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation
	He JZ 1,2,3; Wang RW[*]1; Jensen CXJ 4; Li YT 5
刊名	SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
	2015
卷号	5 期号:X 页码:e7715
通讯作者	wangrw@mail.kiz.ac.cn
合作状况	其它
英文摘要	Avoiding the tragedy of the commons requires that one or more individuals in a group or partnership "volunteer'', benefiting the group at a cost to themselves. Recognition and negotiation with social partners can maintain cooperation, but are often not possible. If recognition and negotiation are not always the mechanism by which cooperative partnerships avoid collective tragedies, what might explain the diverse social cooperation observed in nature? Assuming that individuals interact asymmetrically and that both "weak'' and "strong'' players employ a super-rational strategy, we find that tragedy of the commons can be avoided without requiring either recognition or negotiation. Whereas in the volunteer's dilemma game a rational "strong'' player is less likely to volunteer to provide a common good in larger groups, we show that under a wide range of conditions a super-rational "strong'' player is more likely to provide a common good. These results imply that the integration of super-rationality and asymmetric interaction might have the potential to resolve the tragedy of the commons. By illuminating the conditions under which players are likely to volunteer, we shed light on the patterns of volunteerism observed in variety of well-studied cooperative social systems, and explore how societies might avert social tragedies.
收录类别	SCI
资助信息	This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (31370408,31270433, 31170408, 71161020, 10961027), the National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars (31325005), NSFC-Yunnan United fund (U1302267), the West Light Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Yunnan Natural Science Foundation (2013FD030), Special Fund for Chair Professor Lei Shi, Special Fund for Provincial Key Disciplines– Statistics, the Program for Innovative Research Team (in Science and Technology) in University of Yunnan Province.
语种	英语
公开日期	2015-02-13
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://159.226.149.42:8088/handle/152453/8257]
专题	昆明动物研究所_实验与理论生态学昆明动物研究所_遗传资源与进化国家重点实验室
作者单位	1.State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, Yunnan, 650223, P.R. China 2.Statistics and Mathematics College, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, 650221, P.R. China 3.Yunnan Tongchuang Computing & Data Mining Center, Kunming, Yunnan, 650221, P.R. China 4.Department of Mathematics and Science, School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Pratt Institute, 200 Willoughby Avenue, Brooklyn, NY, USA 5.School of Mathematics and Statistics, Yunnan University, Kunming, Yunnan, 650091, P.R. China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	He JZ,Wang RW[*],Jensen CXJ,et al. Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation[J]. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,2015,5(X):e7715.
APA	He JZ,Wang RW[*],Jensen CXJ,&Li YT.(2015).Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation.SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,5(X),e7715.
MLA	He JZ,et al."Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation".SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 5.X(2015):e7715.